Today: a grownup returns to high school civics class, and is surprised by what he finds.
I recently completed a full reading of the Federalist Papers for the first time. It was the first time since high school I had cracked the cover of the book and my reaction to it was rather different than I recall the first time around.

America reveres its constitution, yet the men who wrote it would surely be astounded by the strength of today’s federal government and the comparative weakness of the states. This sentence, essayed a few years ago in a British newspaper (The Economist) surprised me a bit. I had always had a fond, though not particularly educated, admiration for the genius of the Founders, and I was surprised to consider that this whole thing had played out much differently from how they would have (mistakenly?) expected. This lit a match under the Jules Goldberg contraption which is my memory, and ultimately got me to thinking about the semester of US Government class in high school, during which we were required to read certain numbers of The Federalist Papers. It was the fall of 1988, Ronald Reagan had served our nation for eight mostly glorious years, and in spite of the general snarkiness fondly directed at our illustrious leader by many of my classmates, I had escaped the strenuously clever cynicism embraced by many my age and unironically considered myself lucky and proud to be an American.

At the time I had only limited understanding of how the federal government worked; sure, I knew the three branches, checks and balances and all that, and wrote a really compelling paper urging abandonment of the Electoral College in favor of the direct popular election of the president, as all high school students seem obliged to advocate at some point, but most of the nuances were completely lost on me. I nonetheless had a rather touching belief that what we as a people were about was right, and that our seemingly eternal system of government was the very best which the genius of man could conceivably produce. In comparison to the systems of government labored under by those in the USSR, China, East Germany, and even much of Europe in 1988, I was not altogether without basis in believing this.

So I was handed a dog-eared paperback copy of The Federalist Papers. The subject was broached with some introductory remarks from our instructor which seemed to last longer than could be believed, but from which all I absorbed was that the Papers were a plain-English explanation of how the Founding Fathers (thus were they still called in the halcyon days before political correctness) meant for the new Constitutional government to work, stripped of all the 18th-Century legalese of the Constitution itself. The papers had been written in opposition to a group collectively known as the Anti-Federalists, who had urged rejection of the Constitution.

This may have been bland oversimplification, but I’m pretty sure I wasn’t paying attention and that was all I gleaned from the introductory remarks. I already knew the Constitution represents an inspired form of government and was written by men of rare elemental genius; I didn’t know who these Anti-Federalists were but they sounded like assholes. They sounded to me like those Southern Rebs of a later era, intent on gratuitously wrecking everything for the rest of us, for sake of advancing their own selfish interests. And I was sure that this book, written after all by the guy on the ten-dollar bill, spoke the truth and advocated a form of government which could scarcely be improved.

But I didn’t want to read it. I was never terribly serious in high school about, well, classes or anything, and I recall harboring an aversion to completing the assignment for some reason. Which response was typical for me, and not particular to the reading assignment. No matter how much truth was contained in that book, I had little interest in reading a “plain-English” commentary on the subject written in 18th-Century prose, which was indistinguishable to me at the time from the King James Bible or Shakespeare. I was pretty sure I had all the truth I needed already, and didn’t want to sink the work into it to get any more.

Yeah. I was a pain in the ass in high school. If you’re wondering how I ever graduated with an attitude like this, you’re not alone.

So I kind of schlepped through the assignment, skimming through what we were to read and ignoring what we were to skim, bluffed my way through whatever exams or papers were required, and generally didn’t take much away from the whole experience, except that we were lucky Alexander Hamilton had been on our side and hadn’t been a Communist or something; and that upon my supposedly closer examination, the Anti-Federalists were still assholes.

Fifteen humbling years later, I found myself engaged in an online discussion with a gentleman over the real causes why the Federal government had become so much more powerful than the Founders would have expected, prompted by that throwaway remark mentioned earlier from The Economist. I’ve become a rather mild form of one of those states’ rights wackos: I believe the Federal government is rather too big and much too powerful for our collective good, but I don’t spend my free time scanning the horizon for black UN helicopters or refusing to drink fluoridated water or any other such silly nonsense. I was explaining my personal theory that virtually all our troubles along these lines can be traced to the sixteenth amendment, due to the power this allows of conditional appropriations, and that while repeal of this amendment is too radical a notion to be likely, it would result in a relationship between the States and Federal governments much more consistent with what the Federalists had wanted.

This gentleman surprised me by saying that it was the Federalists’ fault we were in this particular mess; the Anti-Federalists had objected to the original Constitution because it did too little to protect individual and states’ rights and did not contain effective checks upon the Federal government. Far from being crazed wackos, the Anti-Federalists had actually been right all along—the proposed Constitution sowed the seeds for its own eventual demise, and, once ratified, really did lead to a preposterously powerful national government. This whole notion slapped my ignorant little high school paradigm right between the eyes, and I realized that if I were to have any self-respect as a commentator on this particular subject, or if I could have the slightest pretense to holding an informed opinion, I’d have to look into this in some detail.

I’ve never read much direct political philosophy. I flatter myself I’m a practical analyst, not a philosopher, and most of my reading has been in economics and most of my arguing has been over economic policy. I’d always taken for granted that the system basically works, and never questioned how or why, and only debated what was best to be done within the system itself. That suddenly seemed rather a superficial conclusion to have reached with having conducted no real analysis whatever.

So I reached for my copy of The Federalist Papers, which I had bought (partially, perhaps, out of guilt for my treatment of it in high school) ten years ago yet had never opened, and began to read. I discovered delightedly that it’s not quite as textually dense as the King James Bible—though it’s close. But offsetting that happy discovery was the fact that it’s 600 pages long and it ended up taking me three months to plod through it all.

It was an eye-opening and profitable experience. The first thing that strikes the modern reader was just how dire the situation was when the Constitution was written. Everyone knows the Articles of Confederation were bad, but it’s rather lost on most of us today just how bad.

The entire Federal government in 1787 consisted of a unicameral legislature. That was it. It had some theoretically unlimited (but highly theoretical) abilities to levy troops and taxes, but no ability to enforce its levies. And it was to levy these not directly from the populace as a whole, but from the various state governments, which then had to take positive steps to comply with the Federal government’s requests. Or to partially comply. Or to drag their feet in interminable debate about which states are paying their fair share or more than, and whether to comply fully, partially, or not at all. Eventually. An modern analogy which comes to mind is the highly political debate in the US Congress which periodically surfaces about contributing troops to UN peacekeeping efforts, or even to paying UN dues; and the outcome to these discussions under the Articles of Confederation was about as timely and reliable as this modern analogue.

With the credit and survivability of the early Union seriously in doubt, there were at least some voices which advocated complete dissolution of the Union in favor of thirteen individual republics bound by nothing stronger than a NATO-style defensive alliance, or a series of bilateral defensive alliances, or even three or four miniature nations, comprised of the regional confederacy of several states. As preposterous as these ideas sound to the modern reader, discoursing on the dangers of such an approach occupied the first thirteen papers, suggesting that this outcome was not entirely out of the question even then (though the authors suggested this was a recent and outlandish notion).

So, having fought a rugged war for independence and struggled along under the ineffective Articles for some time, the Constitutional Convention in Philadelphia in 1787 passed this proposed constitution, with the stipulation that it would take effect if conventions in three-fourths of the states approved it. It’s not entirely clear what would have become of any minority of states which rejected ratification, should three-fourths have passed it. So with seven states having already ratified it, in 1788-89 James Madison, Alexander Hamilton, and John Jay wrote a series of essays encouraging adoption, which appeared in various New York newspapers during the debates in that state whether to support ratification.

With this as a backdrop, the three authors first discussed whether it would be advantageous even to sustain the Union (papers 1-13 argued that it would be); whether the current government was up to the task (14-22 argued that it was not); and then addressed more or less particular complaints which had been heard during the debates and which had appeared in newspapers and pamphlets over the remaining 63 articles.

The general tenor of the arguments directed against the Anti-Federalists is, indeed, an argument for stronger federal institutions. That was slightly disheartening, and seemed at the outset to suggest that my Anti-Federalist correspondent had perhaps been correct. But there’s more to it than that suggests.

It’s quite significant that the papers were written at a time when the entire history of the American Union comprised a period of tremendous weakness in the national government and a corresponding strength in the state governments; and that we read those papers today in a period where precisely the opposite is true. When Hamilton, especially, called for an energetic federal government, he did so relative to the striking ineptitude and helplessness of the federal government as it existed at the time. He urged that reason dictates that a government have powers adequate to execute their purposes, which itself seems unexceptional; he seemed to believe that the government needed to be as powerful as the Constitution proposed just in order to do those things expected of it by other sections of the Constitution.

But the Federalists were insistent that the proposed system was genuinely federal, not national. James Madison spent the entirety of paper 39 contrasting the characteristics of typical Federal, and typical National, governments, ultimately concluding that the proposed system had, well, a lot of both. Madison sums up the substance of the debate between the Federalists and Anti-Federalists smartly, by attributing the following amalgamation of arguments to the Anti-Federalists:

“But it was not sufficient,” say the adversaries of the proposed Constitution, “for the convention to adhere to the republican form. They ought, with equal care, to have preserved the FEDERAL form, which regards the Union as a CONFEDERACY of sovereign states; instead of which, they have framed a NATIONAL government, which regards the Union as a CONSOLIDATION of the States.” (Madison, Fed 39, emphasis in original)

He proceeded to show, over the balance of this paper, that the proposed government was of a mixed form, insofar as it guaranteed a republican form of government to the states: the states are sovereign within their own boundaries over certain administrative elements; the federal government is sovereign over certain other administrative elements within each state’s boundaries. This concept of dual sovereignty is the whole essence of Federalism.

The Constitution is to be founded on the assent and ratification of the people of America, given by deputies elected for the special purpose; (…) this assent and ratification is to be given by the people, not as individuals composing one entire nation, but as composing the distinct and independent States to which they respectively belong. It is to be the assent and ratification of the several States, derived from the supreme authority in each State, the authority of the people themselves. The act, therefore, establishing the Constitution, will not be a NATIONAL, but a FEDERAL act. (Ibid.)

In a further passage which could only be written before adoption of the 17th Amendment, which amendment provides for US Senators to be elected by the people at large, rather than state legislatures, Madison continues:

The House of Representatives will derive its powers from the people of America; and the people will be represented in the same proportion, and on the same principle, as they are in the legislature of a particular State. So far the government is NATIONAL, not FEDERAL. The Senate, on the other hand, will derive its powers from the States, as political and coequal societies; and these will be represented on the principle of equality in the Senate, as they now are in the existing Congress. So far the government is FEDERAL, not NATIONAL. (Ibid.)

This reliance on appointment of US Senators by the state legislatures is eye-opening for the modern American reader. The whole notion of relegating the appointment of Senators to a small legislative body instead of a popular vote seems so…undemocratic. This is addressed at some length in a later paper, and is a subject to which we shall return here as well.

Madison continues his argument to justify labeling the new government as mixed, neither quite national nor quite federal:

The executive power will be derived from a very compound source. The immediate election of the President is to be made by the States in their political characters. The votes allotted to them are in a compound ratio, which considers them partly as distinct and coequal societies, partly as unequal members of the same society. The eventual election, again, is to be made by that branch of the legislature which consists of the national representatives; but in this particular act they are to be thrown into the form of individual delegations, from so many distinct and coequal bodies politic. From this aspect of the government it appears to be of a mixed character, presenting at least as many FEDERAL as NATIONAL features.

If we try the Constitution by its last relation to the authority by which amendments are to be made, we find it neither wholly NATIONAL nor wholly FEDERAL. Were it wholly national, the supreme and ultimate authority would reside in the MAJORITY of the people of the Union; and this authority would be competent at all times, like that of a majority of every national society, to alter or abolish its established government. Were it wholly federal, on the other hand, the concurrence of each State in the Union would be essential to every alteration that would be binding on all. The mode provided by the plan of the convention is not founded on either of these principles. In requiring more than a majority, and particularly in computing the proportion by STATES, not by CITIZENS, it departs from the NATIONAL and advances towards the FEDERAL character; in rendering the concurrence of less than the whole number of States sufficient, it loses again the FEDERAL and partakes of the NATIONAL character. (Ibid.)

So how to reconcile the intent of the Founders to have produced a mixed government, and the observations of (among many others) The Economist and my Anti-Federalist correspondent that the Federal government has far, far more power than was ever intended in Philadelphia in 1787? Some participants in the Convention, including, as it turns out, Hamilton and Madison, had argued for a more nationalist government to begin with. But these notions were rejected, and the Convention finally approved a plan genuinely intended to ensure national security while preserving the substance, not just the form, of dual sovereignty. They intended it to be mixed, and it eventually became preponderantly unmixed nationalism. What happened?

It bears some consideration why the Founders believed the mixed government would retain some considerable permanence, and not be encroached on one side (oppression of the states by the Federal government) or the other (disregard of the Federal government by the states). Madison, again, writes:

Several important considerations have been touched in the course of these papers, which discountenance the supposition that the operation of the federal government will by degrees prove fatal to the State governments. The more I revolve the subject, the more fully I am persuaded that the balance is much more likely to be disturbed by the preponderancy of the last than of the first scale. (Madison, Fed 45)

This obviously proved wildly inaccurate. It’s clear that the actual practice, as embodied in the, shall we say, informally granted powers of the Federal government, have tended in precisely the opposite direction as anticipated—more power for the Federales, less power for the states. I don’t pretend to having my admiration for the Founders diminished by having stumbled upon such an error, but it is at this point one must recognize that while the practical system they put in place has worked rather well for some considerable time, some of their early judgments were entirely off the mark. Mistaken, indeed. I have a few notions how this has come to pass; but let’s consider Madison’s arguments: for this there is no better place to start than by examining paper 45, The Alleged Danger From the Powers of the Union to the State Governments Considered, fairly closely.

Madison begins paper 45 with the assertion that “HAVING shown that no one of the powers transferred to the federal government is unnecessary or improper, the next question to be considered is, whether the whole mass of them will be dangerous to the portion of authority left in the several States.” My purpose in this discussion is not to examine minutely all the arguments in favor of the Constitution, and I’m willing to grant at this point that most of the particular powers actually granted to the Federal government by the Constitution do, in fact, seem reasonable and consistent with its responsibilities; and that Madison, Hamilton, and Jay have presented a compelling enough justification for them in the papers which preceded number 45.

Madison continues in paper 45 by pointing to some historical analogies, which seem vaguely unsatisfying: the Achaean League, and the Lycian Confederacy, both of which had been discussed briefly in previous articles. The Achaean League was a federation of Greek city-states in the age of the early Roman Republic. The Lycian Confederacy was comprised of a number of city-state petty republics scattered throughout what is now Turkey, and was a few centuries after the dissolution of the Achaean League. Madison notes that

In the Achaean league it is probable that the federal head had a degree and species of power, which gave it a considerable likeness to the government framed by the convention. The Lycian Confederacy, as far as its principles and form are transmitted, must have borne a still greater analogy to it. Yet history does not inform us that either of them ever degenerated, or tended to degenerate, into one consolidated government. On the contrary, we know that the ruin of one of them proceeded from the incapacity of the federal authority to prevent the dissensions, and finally the disunion, of the subordinate authorities. (Madison, Fed 45)

It’s probably similar to the Convention’s planned government; and history doesn’t precisely say that either collapsed into nationalism. I may be looking at this too hard, but this probable similarity and absence of a known negative outcome isn’t an entirely compelling argument. But, returning to Madison:

The State governments may be regarded as constituent and essential parts of the federal government; whilst the latter is nowise essential to the operation or organization of the former. Without the intervention of the State legislatures, the President of the United States cannot be elected at all. They must in all cases have a great share in his appointment, and will, perhaps, in most cases, of themselves determine it. (Ibid)

This, presumably, refers to Article II, Section 1, which describes the term of the President and his manner of election: “Each state shall appoint, in such manner as the Legislature thereof may direct, a number of electors, equal to the whole number of Senators and Representatives to which the State may be entitled in the Congress,” describing thusly the composition of the electoral college (emphasis added). The general process, including the reliance upon the state legislatures to determine some of the particulars of the election, has held up reasonably well, but has (especially recently) seen substantial encroachments upon this power by the Federal courts.

Not all this encroachment has been for the worse; states being obligated to drop Jim Crow laws designed to minimize black participation in the electoral process is itself an unalloyed good, for example. But Florida 2000 was of course a horrible mess, with the US Supreme Court ultimately deciding how matters would be conducted in what should have been primarily (according to Article II) a state matter. This was necessary, or even possible, only because of the bizarre activism of the State Supreme Court, in its attempt to rewrite rules after the election and subject different parts of the state to differing methods and standards for the recount. In both these instances, (Jim Crow and Florida) the Federal courts put paid to what was legitimately bogus state laws (or activist judicial interpretation of state laws, in the Florida case); the only unfortunate element to these Federal rulings is that by now all parties recognize that the Federal courts are unambiguously in charge of how elections are run, and the state legislatures are reduced to determining trivial administrative elements to the election (the form, but not the substance, of certification for example). So with respect to this particular argument of Madison’s, one potential factor tilting the relative power in favor of the state governments has been eliminated by (admittedly otherwise salutary) Federal judicial activism. Madison continues:

The Senate will be elected absolutely and exclusively by the State legislatures. (Ibid)

This no longer applies, since the 17th Amendment devolved this power to the people at large. While this amendment was intended to reduce the rampant corruption which dominated the process of appointing US Senators in the state legislatures, it did remove one of the most significant hurdles to Nationalism (as opposed to Federalism). Even in cases where the Federal Congress does not overstep its constitutional limits, it has tremendous power to bully state governments by way of conditional expenditures. These are, as the name implies, Federal expenditures on state matters, which are approved only as conditioned upon state legislatures “voluntarily” adopting a policy preferred by the Federal Congress. An excellent example of this was the 1974 adoption by the Congress of a Federal 55-MPH “suggested” speed limit. This speed limit was binding on Interstate highways, but not on State highways; however, states were—shall we say—encouraged to voluntarily adopt the 55-MPH limit on State highways as well, by Federal threat of withholding highway maintenance monies which would otherwise flow from Federal taxpayers and ultimately to the states. The puzzling logic of a Federal tax, partially paid by Ohioans, which would then only be refunded to Ohio for use on maintaining Ohio roads if the Ohio legislature adopted the Federal position, is an effective (though not legal) breach of the principle of dual sovereignty espoused by the Founders at the time of ratification of the Constitution.

As well intended as the 17th Amendment may have been in fighting corruption, it is hard to imagine conditional expenditures being used to thwart Federalist (dual sovereignty) principles by a US Senate elected and beholden directly to state legislatures. Using a financial end-around such as the highway-monies-for-speed-limits measure to strip state legislatures of their original portions of sovereignty would not likely have been approved by a body elected by those very state legislators whose power would thereby be denuded. And preventing this subtle usurpation of state power was entirely the principle behind having the Federal Senate appointed by State legislatures:

It is equally unnecessary to dilate on the appointment of senators by the State legislatures. Among the various modes which might have been devised for constituting this branch of the government, that which has been proposed by the convention is probably the most congenial with the public opinion. It is recommended by the double advantage of favoring a select appointment, and of giving to the State governments such an agency in the formation of the federal government as must secure the authority of the former, and may form a convenient link between the two systems. (Hamilton or Madison, Fed 62)

Adoption of the 17th Amendment therefore was intended to curb one evil (corruption), but decidedly allowed expansion of another (nationalism). And, sadly, with the perhaps unavoidable influence of big money in politics today, I am scarcely convinced that corruption has even been meaningfully reduced in the election of US Senators today despite adoption of the 17th Amendment.

But back to Madison:

Thus, each of the principal branches of the federal government will owe its existence more or less to the favor of the State governments, and must consequently feel a dependence, which is much more likely to beget a disposition too obsequious than too overbearing towards them. On the other side, the component parts of the State governments will in no instance be indebted for their appointment to the direct agency of the federal government, and very little, if at all, to the local influence of its members. (Madison, Fed 45)

Hm. We have seen that the Federal judiciary now is the final arbiter of how states run their own elections, including that for president; that the Federal Senate is no longer dependent for its existence on the actions of the state legislature; and nowhere in this paper is the third branch mentioned (the judiciary). Even in its original form, the judiciary was dependent on the states only insofar as the Federal Senate exercised its advice and consent responsibility in the confirmation of Federal judges, and the Senators were themselves appointed by the State legislatures. The increased activism by, and reverence for, the Supreme Court, coupled with the 17th Amendment, have rendered all Madison’s arguments based on structures null thus far.

He continues by observing that there will be more State officers (of all departments) than corresponding Federal officers. This is perhaps unexceptional but is also somewhat unconvincing; his main argument here seems to be that since more of any given individual’s friends and family will be officers of his state than will be Federal officers in his state, the average citizen will feel more loyalty to the State officers (and hence the State government) than the Federal opposites. This is all slightly dubious but not really enough for us to dawdle over this point, with so much still to cover.

Suddenly Madison wanders rapidly into the weeds with his next expectation which failed to pan out:

It is true, that the Confederacy is to possess, and may exercise, the power of collecting internal as well as external taxes throughout the States; but it is probable that this power will not be resorted to, except for supplemental purposes of revenue; that an option will then be given to the States to supply their quotas by previous collections of their own; and that the eventual collection, under the immediate authority of the Union, will generally be made by the officers, and according to the rules, appointed by the several States. Indeed it is extremely probable, that in other instances, particularly in the organization of the judicial power, the officers of the States will be clothed with the correspondent authority of the Union.

Should it happen, however, that separate collectors of internal revenue should be appointed under the federal government, the influence of the whole number would not bear a comparison with that of the multitude of State officers in the opposite scale. (Ibid)

This, clearly, is as untrue as the original assertion that the states were likelier to bully or ignore the Federal government than the opposite, and is almost laughably inaccurate to anyone who’s ever dealt with the IRS. What happened here?

Well, the IRS is a good place to start. The IRS wasn’t formed until after the 16th Amendment was ratified, which only in 1913 authorized the Federal Government to enact an unlimited tax to be levied upon citizens’ income. Prior to the ratification of that amendment, the Federal government relied primarily on excise taxes for revenue. Total Federal outlays in 1912, the year before the collection of unlimited income tax was permitted, amounted to $690 Million. Ten years later, that figure had swelled to $3.289 Billion, a fivefold increase (Office of Management and Budget, FY2002 Federal Budget.)

After WWII concluded and the economy demobilized from a war footing, by 1947 Federal outlays dropped to $34.496 Billion (14.7% of GDP); by 2002 these figures had ballooned to $2.011Trillion and 19.5% of GDP. (Office of Management and Budget, FY2004 Federal Budget.) Growth in Federal government spending clearly outpaces economic growth, and nothing fuels a massive temptation to spend like the ability to massively increase taxes. The income tax allows precisely that.

This massive uptick in Federal receipts and outlays means that a greater proportion of total economic activity involves the Federal government as a direct participant than is strictly necessary, giving the Federales a disproportionate amount of influence as to how that money is spent. The conditional appropriations example from earlier applies as an excellent example here as well; the Federal government has no real relevance to questions of certain expenditures like maintenance of Ohio highways. If Ohioans paid more State taxes commensurate with paying fewer Federal taxes, Ohio’s elected state Representatives could decide or not decide on its own whether the State’s highways needed maintenance, and also could decide on its own whether to adopt the “suggested” 55-MPH Federal speed limit on its own roads.

It therefore follows clearly that the actual preponderance of Federal power at the expense of the State governments, quite contrary of what the Founders predicted would happen, can thus also be partially attributed to the 16th and 17th Amendments, both ratified in 1913. Granting the Federal government tremendous new powers of taxation at the same time as removing the primary mechanism for State governments to directly check the ambitions of the Federal government has led to a highly nationalistic result which, frankly, should have been easy to anticipate.

Add to this the Union’s strength being forged in a grim Civil War, and the sense of nationhood developed during two World Wars this past century, and the conscious attempts made during the New Deal to increase the relevance and influence of the Federal government over citizens’ daily lives, and it becomes rather clearer how the spirit of Federalism has waned somewhat, and a sense of nationalism has replaced it. It is not a mere antique artifact of the period’s written English that, during the time of the Founders, the Union was referred to as “These United States,” implying a plural group acting together; while today, of course, we refer to “The United States,” a monolithic body. Telephones, the internet, and air travel all contribute to nationhood, but must we have an inexorable march toward nationalism and the permanent abandonment of Federalism?

Now the ongoing sparring between the Federalists and Anti-Federalists during 1787-89 can be cast in rather a different light. Upon a short bit of further reading while preparing this article, I uncovered the fact that Hamilton had participated in the 1787 convention, but had quit in frustration when it was clear that his arguments in favor of installing a constitutional monarch would be rejected. He ultimately signed the Convention’s findings and draft Constitution, despite disagreeing with the plan himself, and argued in the Federalist Papers for ratification primarily because the alternative to ratification was a continuance of the status quo under the Articles of Confederation, which he believed would be fatal for the nation. And Madison may have preferred a much more nationalistic government himself, calling at one point for the Federal Congress to have a negative (veto) over laws enacted by the various state legislatures.

Clearly from all this, it is superficial to refer simply to the beliefs or intents of “the Founders,” as if they had a monolithic and uniform strategy which they enacted in the face of public opposition. That Hamilton argued against his own original position because he then believed the alternative was truly in the nation’s interest speaks highly of his patriotism, back when such a label had an actual meaning and was not mainly used in the negative against one’s political opponents. And for me, the debate between the Federalists and Anti-Federalists has only been explored from one perspective thus far, that of an advocacy piece authored collectively by a small group of Federalists. I have acquired a two-volume set from the Library of America, The Debate on the Constitution, which contains pamphlets, newspaper articles, private letters, and Convention speeches both for and against the proposed Constitution. I have moved this to the top of the reading queue.

These few thoughts on The Federalist Papers only, after all, address one element of the matter. So much remains to be read, digested, and discussed.

It’s amazing what studying the source documents can do for one’s understanding of politics. I only wish modern politics could just occasionally consist of civilized discussion, even disagreement, on principles, relieving us of the sight of Senators themselves waving silly placards and demagoguing over whether to give or not give free pills to senior citizens. That the world’s most august deliberative body is reduced to such claptrap is perhaps the biggest shame of all.

In browsing this week's entrants into The Truth Laid Bear's New Weblog Showcase this week, two jump out as deserving some attention:

A new two-man wrecking crew has surfaced over at Indirect Proof. They've put out an article about Rush, and those who continue to (rightly) criticize him. The article itself is well-written, even if it's about an issue which doesn't interest me much. The blog itself looks to have some promise. The particular article in question is Fair Game.

And, though I hate piling on, Free Market Fairy Tales is written by a gentleman from the othe side of the big Atlantic pond and looks plainly very good. His current article, Europe Hates America, proves that not quite all Europeans hate America, the title of his article notwithstanding.

Check out these brand new weblogs and see if you like them.

JKS.

I never ever thought I'd say this, but I'm with Ted Kennedy on this one.
This current Medicare expansion effort has produced some of the most puzzling politics you're ever likely to see. I find myself amazed to agree with Kennedy, Pelosi, et al, who want to block the Medicare bill--though not for the same reason they want to block it. The AARP is, amazingly, siding with Bush, who clearly wants passage of the bill, over Kennedy, who clearly wants to block it--though they still are not speaking the president's name despite his efforts on their behalf.

Now for my opinion of the particular merits of the bill, from the perspective of an actual end user, I'm inclined to defer to the "expert consumers" of the product of the bill, the AARP. They seem to like it. But the Wall Street Journal, for example, keeps complaining about expanding the benefit without sufficient fundamental reform to a program which is rapidly becoming utterly unaffordable in its current state; whatever fundamental reforms are contained in the bill are basically token gestures which, as I understand it, allow for seniors to opt into a competing private plan, only at their own choice, and only in 2010.

So the AARP likes it, conservatives don't like it, and yet Daschle and Kennedy think it's a "lemon" of a bill (Daschle's word). Daschle is a typically cynical politician, and here he is opposing something one of his most reliable constituencies is supporting. He's either so opposed to the notion of competition that the mere mention of the word, even in a token gesture context, makes him immediately curl up into a defensive fetal position and vote NO, or he's actually maneuvering to try to deny President Bush a domestic agenda victory which Republicans could use in 2004 as a model of how Republicans Get Results, even results for a core Democratic issue. As politicians include temporary, far future provisions in bills all the time, intending all along to change them before they actually happen (think of the ludicrous sunset provisions in year ten of the recent tax cuts), I'd bet on the explanation which is motivated entirely by 2004 electoral politicking.

So why do I oppose the bill, since it's clearly not for the same reason Kenndy and Daschle do? Simple: Medicare and Social Security already consume in excess of one-third of the Federal budget, and are projected to get horribly and unsustainably bigger all on their own. It's not sound in the long run already; despite the terrible political consequences of it, at some point we have to be serious about it, and differentiate our nation from Europe in our response to a social entitlement which so far outstrips our ability to pay for it. The Europeans preserve these programs, and politicians earnestly assure each other and their constituents that of course reducing the free money everyone gets from the government can't be reduced. This is one element of why European economic growth and productivity growth are embarrassed by comparison to the US.

At some point, preferably sooner than later, we should recognize that difficult and unpopular decisions will be necessary. Medicare is already horribly expensive and inefficient, and extending another free benefit (conservatively, almost laughably, estimated at some $400 Billion over ten years, but most analysts expect it will be much more, myself included) as part of this program is the very last thing we should be considering.

And--Tom Daschle take note--though it is rather impolitic to observe, this expensive free benefit is being granted to a demographic group--seniors--who have the highest average net worth of any demographic group in America. It's almost a little surprising that Redistributionist Daschle wants to give such a giveaway to--quite literally--The Wealthiest Americans, if only they could get those darned competition provisions out of it. Or it would be surprising, if anything he did were really on principle instead of just based on electoral propitiousness.

Now, truly, I'm greatly disappointed in Bush for pushing so hard to pass this. His tax cuts have certainly helped the economy, but on the spending side he is proving to be no fiscal conservative (and his free trade credentials are lagging as well). This entirely unaffordable benefit is clearly a sop to an electorally critical demographic, in an attempt to buy votes in 2004. And Daschle's, Kennedy's, and Pelosi's opposition to it is every bit as cynically an attempt to cost Bush senior citizens' votes next year's election.

The politics on both sides of this debate could kindly be called disappointing, at generous best. The actual merits of the bill are awful, based on our ability to afford it, and for once here's hoping Daschle will follow through on his threats of a filibuster. This bill is not only bad, but dangerously bad, and it needs to be defeated. I just hope the Democrats' cynicism is able to trump the Republicans' cynicism on this one.

JKS.

Tonight the Sylvania City Council held its first public meeting since the election in which Issue 16 passed and two of the Gang of Four were unseated, and this time I was in attendance. It proved rather an interesting scene.

Our mayor, Mr Craig Stough, indicated that he had engaged in some discussions with the Metroparks, who are expected to manage operations of the Lathrop House once it is moved and opened for tours. Mr Stough suggested it would be more common for him to have formal approval of Council for these negotiations. Councilman Barbara Sears obliged by submitting a motion to formally re-grant authorization for Mr Stough to conduct these negotiations. Her motion was seconded and the rather muted fireworks began as the matter was cast open to discussion. Some of the potential obstacles which remain were illuminated.

Councilman John Billis, soon to no longer be a Councilman himself, took a subtly hostile position with the precise wording of the Issue language (that "the City of Sylvania shall not acquire the property known as the Lathrop House property and 5362 South Main Street, Sylvania, Ohio by appropriation;" and "the City of Sylvania shall not re-file any such action, or file a similar action for appropriation of the Lathrop property for a period of two years from the date of the enactment of this Ordinance." The full text of Issue 16 as it appeared on the ballot can be found here.)

Billis's position was that this language, explicitly forbidding appropriation of the property, fundamentally forbids as well any appropriation for the property; playing on the twin meanings of the word (in the first case, to expropriate, in the second case to allocate.) So Billis staked out the position that the City shouldn't spend any money on this issue at all, including any contribution to moving the house.

In fairness to Mr Billis, Mr Stough did acknowledge that he and other members of Council had been troubled all along by some of the precise Issue language, but that everyone knew that Billis's interpretation hadn't been anyone's intent. But Mr Billis's statement began a great movement away from compromise, now that the voters had decreed that a compromise was essential, which movement would unfortunately continue through many of the subsequent speakers.

One woman in the audience stood up and, reading a prepared statement, said that much of Citizens for Sylvania's campaign literature had been misleading and baseless, and that besides that it now constituted something of a legally binding campaign promise. She singled out Mrs Sears and Mr Kriner for having endorsed Issue 16, leading both to state for the record that this (emphatically) was not true. Still she continued to insist Mrs Sears had endorsed the Issue, till Mrs Sears flatly stated "Did not," beyond which the matter was not pursued. The speaker insisted that Citizens for Sylvania's campaign promises were binding but that they should not have included any consideration of the previous promises by Friends of the Lathrop House (hereafter FOLH) for funding to contribute to the move. She tacked on the rather surprising notion that Citizens for Sylvania was being insensitive to African Americans because of their stance on this whole issue.

Another woman in the audience stood up and read from another prepared statement, at considerable length, claiming essentially the same thing. She darkly hinted that the voters had been misled by Citizens for Sylvania's various promises, perhaps implying that the vote should therefore be set aside at least in spirit if not in fact (if that wasn't her intent, I'm not honestly sure what was). She made quite a point of mentioning that she was not speaking in an official capacity for FOLH, perhaps fearful of accidentally committing to anything. Much actual applause behind me when she was finished.

At this point some young man whose name I really wish I had caught, sharply attired in a red jogging suit quite inappropriate for the occasion, stood up to a chorus of hisses and quietly snarky remarks from immediately behind me. This fellow, evidently prominent in the Citizens for Sylvania campaign, said essentially can't we all just get along, which evidently was not satisfactory to the FOLH contingent, then insisted he was still looking for funding to try to move the house. He was evasive about where his campaign dollar figures came from, except to allow that the $150,000 relocation costs he had cited rather incredibly didn't include costs to excavate and prepare the new site. More hisses, not altogether unjustifiably, at this.

Another woman spoke, who angled toward forbidding Council from spending any money to help move the house by saying that Citizens for Sylvania's ads had specifically said that approval of Issue 16 would "stop wasting taxpayers' money." She suggested this implied a binding (or at least misleading, I forget precisely which horse she was hitched to by now) campaign promise, and that either that was why she had voted for it in the first place, or why she would have voted for it, if she had voted for it, which it didn't sound like she had. She got the mayor and the City's Law Director, Mr Jim Moen, to instruct her how to go about getting her own ballot initiative going to prohibit the City contributing funding to the relocation of the house. Much tittering of approval from behind me.

Sigh. So much heat, so little light.

I don't think Mr Billis's casuistic parsing of the language on the ballot issue holds water. Lots of words mean two things, and in this case "appropriation of the property" means quite clearly "expropriation of the property." The interpretation suggested by Billis would be credible only if the phrase "appropriation for the property" appeared in the ballot language, which then could scarcely be interpreted in the original, expropriation, sense. I was surprised Mr Moen waffled on this issue when pressed. He should clearly repudiate that argument now, before Mr Stough either negotiates from a position of great ambiguity, or (worse) negotiates terms which his Law Director may subsequently say are illegal.

The rest of the arguments all are more or less the same and so I'll address them together in a minute. The business about the campaign promises is a little troubling, but presently only a little. It does seem Citizens for Sylvania played a bit loose with the truth, giving only the cost for the move but not for the new site preparation. I'd be interested to know the legal relationship between St Josephs and Citizens for Sylvania.

But the numbers don't matter that much, at least not to me. I truly don't care much about the house either way; the historic credentials are ambiguous, and I'm just not that sentimental about it. This is impolitic to say, but I can get away with this since I'm not running for office. I supported Issue 16 because of property rights, and the much bigger issue is what fundamentally FOLH is now urging.

If the house is so important, and the site itself indispensable, the City could have bought it and its land when they were for sale. Or FOLH could have bought it. But then they would have had to pay for it, which ultimately the City evidently came to terms with during its eminent domain campaign.

But that's really the point. In this country we usually make people pay for the things they want. St Joseph wanted the land, they wanted to demolish the house, and they wanted to build a school where the house once stood. And they were willing to pay for all these things.

The position of FOLH is, basically, that they want to excercise authority over a piece of property, which authority normally comes from owning that property, without the muss or fuss of actually having to buy it. They want the house to remain undisturbed, but they don't wan't to pay for it. Since that idea was rejected by the voters, they now want the house moved instead of demolished, and they don't want to pay for that either. And now they rather spitefully don't want the City to either. They want the Church to pay for it alone. Usually people who take things they want but don't pay for them are fundamentally, at best, confidence men and card sharps. FOLH seems genuinely uninterested in compromise, only rather petulantly concerned with getting their own way. For free.

Were I a St Joseph parishoner or administrator, I'd be wishing that the house had been promptly demolished under cover of darkness the moment the demolition permit had been issued, for all the good two years of negotiations have produced. And I'd be questioning the legality of the City not reissuing that permit, since presumably the church had met all the application requirements and the voters have ruled that the City has no eminent domain interest in the site.

For myself, I found all the talk fascinating and horrible to watch. I hope the inauguration of the new Councilmen will put paid to some of this spiteful grasping and that an amicable compromise can actually be reached. I may prepare a few remarks to make at the next Council meeting in case more of this is indulged next month.

In the end, Mrs Sears's motion to authorize Mayor Stough's negotiation efforts was passed 5-2, with only Mr Billis and Mrs Scheidel voting against. Score one step for Council back in the right direction.

JKS.

Tomorrow: less politics, at last! Or maybe more. You be the judge.

Those awful steel tariffs again, and why George Bush should run away from them screaming.
Today the World Trade Organization ruled that the foreign steel tariffs imposed by the Bush administration in 2002 are illegal. Good. They should be scrapped forthwith.

I think the steel tariffs are my #2 disappointment with the Bush administration. They were clearly a shameful sop to a fantastically inefficient industry with production locations scattered throughout midwestern states, like Ohio and Pennsylvania, critical to any successful presidential bid. It's a disgraceful attempt to buy votes by granting lpreferential treatment, which we as consumers (and some who are now unemployed) pay for collectively.

There are some 160,000 steel producing jobs in the US. There are some 12M jobs with companies which consume steel. Every one of those companies pays a higher price for raw materials today as a result of these tariffs; those companies which can pass on higher prices to their customers do so, making (for example) cars more expensive for consumers. Fewer cars get bought when they're more expensive, which itself costs jobs. Several estimates suggest that the cost to the US economy of these tariffs has been on the order of 200,000 jobs, more than the entire steel industry employs. I could go on with this analysis, but few disagree that on balance the tariffs are economically far worse than the ills they mean to cure. The real question is what any of this means politically.

Now the cold political calculus for Bush is what to do about the latest WTO ruling. He could stand his misguided ground and allow the tariffs to ride out the remaining sixteen months before their scheduled termination; he could scrap them immediately; or he could come up with some compromise approach. No comment yet from the administration on their intentions.

Memo to Karl Rove: The Steel Workers Union is so grateful for President Bush's politically bold and economically destructive stance on the tariff issue, that they've already endorsed Dick Gephardt for President in 2004. They didn't even wait to see whether Bush would maintain the tariffs first, which suggests that to them it doesn't matter to them in their decision whom to vote for. And let's face it, Labor is going to endorse a Democrat, without fail, no matter how ludicrous his politics. Even adopting preposterous Democrat-style policies like this terrible steel tariff won't earn George Bush the endorsement or gratitude of the labor unions.

So union types are going to vote against any unnamed Democrat running for President, regardless of what Bush does here. But the unclaimed middle of the electorate continues to be bombarded with claims by Daschle & Co of the number of jobs lost by This President, as they refuse to speak his name (it burns the ears to hear it!), which actually might influence some of them who are presently undecided.

There's not much point in enacting a bunch of tax cuts as a haymaker of a stimulus, and then simultaneously enacting protectionist policies which both cost the economy jobs and add an artificial component of inflation as we struggle to emerge into a real and recognizeable expansion. All that gives you is a fat budget deficit, while minimizing the positive impacts of the tax cuts. It's bad, and it's dumb economics I'd expect more from Democrats. But again I digress into the universally agreed economics of the thing.

The world politics are just as important here. Pascal Lamy has threatened retaliatory tariffs, and implied that these might be aimed at politically important states themselves. The point is that every job lost on account of these tariffs, or on the EU's or Japan's retaliatory tariffs, gives the Democrats more ammunition during next year's election. Bush has got exactly zero love from an industry which clearly dislikes him despite enacting the tariffs they wanted. So I say cut 'em loose and focus on the economics, for sake of the undecided middle who actually would consider voting Republican.

I recently entered my humble little corner of cyberspace into the New Weblog Showcase at The Truth Laid Bear. This is a neat little contest in which new bloggers can throw one of their better posts out there for the world to see, and either earn (or not earn) a bit of readership.

I received eight votes (links from other bloggers) in the week I entered my Everyone's From Somewhere entry into the contest. Many thanks to those who were kind enough to link to the article.

One of the neat benefits to me, apart from receiving a few additional hits which may or may not have convinced those inquistive souls to drop by my blog again, was to see the blogs of those who linked to me. I figured that anyone who actually linked to my site shares some similarity of thought, ideas, or some other dark and inexplicable desire to Be Like Me. Who can tell what motivates such behavior?!

It turns out that of the bloggers who linked to me, all were good and do seem to share some of my perspectives. While I appreciated and enjoyed reading all of them, a couple stood out enough with bringing dissimilar perspectives to bear on their reporting of the world around them to become regular reads, some of which I've added to my purposefully short permanent link list over on the left there:

Susie, over at Practical Penumbra. She thinks her cat is a pirate, even a piratical ninja. I partially agree, insofar as I think cats should be forced to walk the plank, preferably forced by my dog if I can train her to do it. Susie also was kind enough to link to one of my articles, and her site is one of the more interesting apolitical sites you'll come across out there.

Professor Bainbridge, over at, well, Professor Bainbridge. I had checked out his site as he was a new entrant in the Showcase as well, and was fairly impressed, so naturally I was flattered that he linked to my article. He's a professor, though a law professor, and writes compentently about financial markets. It's a bit like reading my own economics and markets essays, though written well and by someone with the credentials to back them up. Even though he seems to have delinked my site (not very sportsmanlike) and inexplicably prefers wine to scotch, his site is excellent and worth a read.

Christian, over at A Life of Freedom, might be my evil twin if I weren't the evil one. And if he weren't a Libertarian. But he's written a number of good articles angling sharply in favor of limited government, a notion I can enthusiastically support.

And be sure to visit Interested-Participant, who seems to be quite a prolific writer, is a fellow Ohioan who seemed to agree with my position on Issue 1, and had the good sense to cast a vote for my article in the Showcase.

Thanks again to all!

JKS.

WTF is the motivation for Al Queda to conduct an operation like this?
As I understand this, Osama has now started a war against his own country, one which is a principal sponsor and funding source for Wahabbi fundamentalism in particular and terrorists in general. This after the infidels have closed their air base on holy Islamic land, and the Saudis contributed to the ongoing success of Al Queda operations with their bland and noncommital response to the 5/12/2003 coordinated Riyadh strikes.

The May strikes at least made "sense," in the narrow meaning that that operation, directed as it was at a mostly-American target group in Osama's Holy Land, was consistent with his psychotic program of senseless maximal destruction inflicted on the west. I don't get what the hell he means to accomplish with this current operation. It's just noise, for sake of getting attention, a bit like a junior high student going on a shooting spree just because society's ignored and repressed him for too long, or some such similar nonsensical justification for gratuitous destruction. That this most recent atrocity does nothing to advance his larger cause is the only consolation which can be drawn.

Many Americans, myself among them, consider Saudi Arabia at best a declared neutral in the war on terror, and very likely a clandestine hostile. The state-funded mandrasses certainly are indirect contributors to the terrorist cause, and I've yet to hear about any really serious moves by the Saudis to freeze assets, or for them to crack down on local militant terrorists in any serious way. So, again, I ask what the hell Osama thinks he'll accomplish by attacking a nation which is probably more like his ally than his enemy in the war on terror? I just don't get it. It's a decision taken more in anger than as a practical strategic gesture. It's clear that our enemy is more a deranged psycho than a grand strategist.

The Saudi ruling family has been between a rock and a hard place for a while now, getting pressure from us to crack down on fundamentalism within their country and freeze assets being used to fund terrorist operations on the one hand; and on the other hand, facing a significant segment of their own population (the Wahabbis) who don't think the House of Saud is fundamentally pure enough for their tastes. If they don't realize it now, they will have to soon: appeasing terrorists, even if they represent a significant demographic within the country one rules, is no guarantor of safety. If Osama is going to pursue this line of activity, I would expect the Saudis to drift more toward being a clandestine friendly than a clandestine hostile, simply in their own attempts to stamp out this kind of mass murder in their own back yard. If this actually came to pass it would be a tremendous help in the war on terror.

JKS.

Update: Jim Lynch has a bit more on this, including some reaction from the Muslim world.

Hooah, and other thoughts on yesterday's ballot returns.
Yesterday's election results were mostly satisfactory and overall I'm rather pleased. Readers from outside my little corner of Ohio who've followed my postings on the Lathrop House vs City Council struggles here will no doubt share my satisfaction that Issue 16 passed by a comfortable margin of some 700 votes, obliging the City to immediately drop its eminent domain proceedings against St Joseph's Church, and preventing them from refiling any similar motions in the next two years.

The issue was clearly the major determining factor in the Council races as well. I am pleased to report that councilman John Billis, by all accounts the ringleader of the Gang of Four, was unelected yesterday with extreme prejudice: he received the fewest votes of any candidate, despite his incumbency. In an open seven-candidate pool, with the top four vote-getters winning Council seats, the winners were Messrs Luetke, Haddad, Haynam, and Borell. In a very close battle for the fourth seat, Mr Borell defeated incumbent (and Gang of Four member) Bonita Scheidel by just 14 votes, 2661-2647. Whoever said that one vote (well, ok, fourteen) hardly matters?

I was delighted to see that Messrs Luetke, Haynam, and Borell were successful in their bids, and that Billis and Scheidel were unelected. I was disappointed that Haddad was retained instead of Flynn securing a seat, but the outcome was still very positive for those who prefer limited government, and I wish Mr Flynn success should he choose to make another bid at the next election.

I wrote previously that approving Issue 16 would not alone be enough to force the issue to conclusion for the Church, in consideration of other delaying tactics Council could introduce. But Council has now gone from a 4-3 majority supporting obstruction of the church building, to a 5-2 majority which prefers a compromise solution. I would now expect that Council would not gratuitously block the conditional use zoning approval, and that both sides in this debacle should come to a fairly amicable solution forthwith.

And, as I've written before, a compromise seems readily available: all it requires is for all parties who are so adamant in the need to preserve the house, to chip in financially to raise the (depending who one asks) $150,000 or so required to move it to a new site. Toledo Metroparks have agreed to operate and maintain it in its new location. There's really only one big question which remains unanswered: who pays for the relocation. I would scarcely consider it a compromise for the Church to have to move, at its own expense, a structure it considers valueless and which it would probably just as soon demolish. If there are others who value the structure so much, I would propose that those parties--who could, after all, have bought the house and land to begin with if they found them so valuable--pay the moving costs.

But that's a lesser detail compared to the joy of victory in the bigger scheme: our City has had a marauding couple of government hooligans, and the issue they embraced, kicked from office. Here's appreciating that the damage they can do in private life will be far less onerous than had they continued in power.

Further, the horrible Ohio Issue 1 initiative was rejected also (though in a rather close 51%-49% vote), making for a one-two-three electoral counterpunch in favor of limited government. Good for us. But for some reason, countywide voters also improved two property tax issues (one of them a new tax) which saddles me with still more government burden. Blech.

Still, all matters considered, a most satisfactory outcome. Congratulations to Sylvania's new councilmen-elect, and to St Joseph's Church, which can finally get down to business in its expansion.

JKS.

Ohio Issue 1 assesment, short version.
So last night I put together a lengthy critique of Ohio Issue 1, which voters will pass judgment on this Tuesday. But I finished it at 4 in the morning while my new little son was keeping me awake, and I'm sure if I read it now it won't make half as much sense as it seemed to at the time. So here's the short form of it, and if I have time I'll edit the longer one and post it tomorrow for anyone who's interested in a closer analysis of it. Or maybe I'll forget about it till Wednesday, at which point it will be moot. Check back and see! Anyhow:

Short Short Version.
Issue 1 is bad. Bad bad bad bad bad.

Now for the details. You've probably seen the really vague TV spots with the Miller High Life guy doing the voiceover and promising up to 30,000 new jobs in exchange for whatever Issue 1 would do to us, which the ad doesn't exactly specify. So, naturally curious, I looked up the Issue language at the Lucas County Board of Elections Issues page. As I read it there are three good reasons to vote no on Issue 1:

1. It's a Constitutional Amendment;
2. It increases spending in a particularly dangerous way;
3. Contrary to what the ads say, it will result in higher taxes.

1. The constitutional amendment worries me. The constitution, whether Federal or State, is the source from which all other government authority is deduced. It's my contention that the government already has far too much in the way of authority, and I'm instinctively resistant to constitutional amendments which give it any more. And I'm forced to wonder, exactly what presently unconstitutional actions is the government contemplating? Read on and see.

2. Read the second point in the Issue, and note particularly the part which talks about authorizing state government to issue funds for "capital formation." What exactly is that?

Capital is a company's funding base--money it has and doesn't have to pay back, and can use for investing in equipment and new product lines and so forth. It fundamentally is company ownership--common stock, for example. Or non-voting stock, or a material ownership in a limited partnership. But what this means is that the State is asking permission to act as a venture capitalist, which results in--quite literally, and without overstating it--state-owned businesses. Certain formerly existing national acronyms who now go by the name "Russians" used to do that all the time, and I don't recall it working really well for them.

Now, as a practical matter, the State of Ohio isn't going to go nationalizing any companies, or any silly things like that. But as a part owner the state could have some say in how the company is managed. And, even with non-voting ownership, the state could cause stock prices and company valuations to fluctuate at their mere whim simply by buying or selling huge stakes in any company they wished to reward or punish. It's a horrible idea.

Suppose a really deserving company had some state funds showered on them in return for partial ownership, and that company's valuation went up. Suppose further that some governor or state senator's sister-in-law owned part of that stock themselves, and then benefitted from the increased valuation the state ownership resulted in. Even if it was innocent, there's a tremendous appearance of conflict of interest, and the charges and countercharges of this sort of thing would be perpetual--and some would likely be correct. The amount of oversight required to attempt to mitigate this threat would be prohibitive, and ultimately not effective anyway.

Allowing the government to buy stakes in companies allows too much scope for mischief. Remember: the system itself has to be the solution, and we cannot rely on the skills and integrity of whomever happens to hold office at a given point.

3. Finally, this is a bond issue. The state issues Ohio notes, gets the cash for them, and buys things with that cash now. The Federal government does this all the time via a process you're probably familiar with: the notes are called Treasuries, and the amounts financed in this manner are referred to collectively as the Federal Deficit. And as with the Federal Deficit, the Ohio Deficit will ultimately have to be paid back to the lenders, either through higher taxes or cuts to future services. Cutting spending is hard for the government, for a variety of reasons; most of which are fundamentally the fault of the citizenry, who have convinced ourselves that we have some kind of entitlement to government money, and vote accordingly. How will the interest and principal be repaid on these bonds? Do you really believe the government will cut spending to make room in the budget for repayment of the bonds, or will we ultimately have to have a tax increase to pay for them?

This seems as good a place as any to trot out my biweekly reference to Alexander Tyler, an 18th-century Scottish historian. He very aptly commented on this exact phenomenon, in the following well-known quote:

A democracy cannot exist as a permanent form of government. It can only exist until the voters discover that they can vote themselves largesse from the public treasury. From that moment on, the majority always votes for the candidates promising the most benefits from the public treasury, with the result that a democracy always collapses over loose fiscal policy, always followed by a dictatorship.

In this country, State government collapses result not in dictatorship but in Federal bailouts. I really don't want the Federales running my fine state either.

Vote no on Ohio Issue 1, and slap down this silly nonsense before our Republican (?) state government does something really permanently damaging to us.

JKS.